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From The Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO
CLASSIFICATION OF CLAIMS

often structure their plans so that
at least one noninsider class will
accept by the necessary margin. It
is not surprising that bankruptcy
courts have been asked to rule on
the propriety of such classification
schemes.
The importance of classification
issues has been especially evident in
single-asset real estate cases. The
surge in the number of single-asset
real estate ventures that have experienced declining real estate values,
reduced rental income, and serious
cash flow problems during the past
few years, has resulted in a greater
volume of chapter 11 cases in which
a single creditor is both the largest
secured creditor and the largest un7
secured creditor. If that creditor
does not vote in favor of a proposed
chapter 11 plan, could the plan be
crammed down? The answer to this
question depends, in part, on whether the plan may place the unsecured
deficiency claim of the nonaccepting mortgagee in a class that is
separate from the class of impaired
general unsecured creditors who are
willing to accept the plan. Many
courts have held that an impaired
undersecured deficiency claim may
not be placed in a class separate
from the class of unsecured creditors, thus making it virtually impossible to obtain confirmation ofa plan

If a chapter 11 plan is not accepted
by every impaired class of claims
or interests, it could be confirmed
only if the plan is crammed down
the rejecting classes in accordance
with Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Most of the cases involving the requirements of a Section 1129(b) cram down focus on
the need for the plan to be ''fair and
equitable'' and that it not '' discriminate unfairly" with respect to the
nonaccepting classes. However, another requirement that has been receiving increasing attention in recent years is that at least one
impaired class of claims, not counting the votes of insiders, accepts the
plan. 1 In essence, a plan may not
be crammed down every class of
creditors.
In view of the requirement that at
least one impaired class of claims
votes to accept the plan, debtors
* Special Counsel to the law finn of
Kaye, Scholer, Fiennan, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the finn of Fried, Frank Harris
Shriver & Jacobson, New York: N.Y.~
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(IO).
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in the absence of the mortgagee's
acceptance. 2
Kliegl Bros.
The increase in litigation involving classification issues in singleasset real estate cases, and the reluctance of courts to permit separate
classification of undersecured deficiency claims, should not lead readers to think that all unsecured claims
of equal rank must always be placed
in one class. The recent decision in

In re Kleigl Bros. Universal Electric
Stage Lighting Co., Inc., 3 is a good
reminder that having more than one
class of unsecured claims in a chapter 11 plan may be justified under
certain circumstances.
In Kliegl Bros., a chapter 11 operating trustee proposed a plan that
contained eight classes. Two allegedly impaired classes accepted the
plan. The first accepting class consisted of a postpetition lender who
agreed to the plan's provision that
has the effect of subordinating a
part of its claim to the claims of
prepetition unsecured creditors.
The second acccepting class consisted only of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW), a union with general unsecured claims for the nonpriority
portion of unpaid prepetition wages.

The plan proposed to pay ffiEW 75
percent of its unsecured claims. The
plan· placed the other general unsecured creditors in a separate class
and proposed to pay them only15
percent of their allowed claims. The
class of general unsecured claims
rejected the plan ''in sufficient numbers that even if the unsecured
claims of the union were included
in the same class as the general
unsecured creditors, that Class
would still reject the Trustee's
plan. " 4
The trustee, in seeking confirmation of the plan, asserted that the
plan may be crammed down nonaccepting classes, including the class
of general unsecured claims, because, in part, at least one impaired
class has accepted it. The U.S. trustee and the debtor objected to confirmation, arguing that the two accepting classes were both not
properly constituted and that, accordingly, no impaired class has
voted in favor ·9f the plan as is
required under SectioJ! 1129(a)(10).
The bankruptcy court stated the
issues as follows: "(1) is the postpetition secured lender entitled to
vote to accept the plan, and (2) can
the general unsecured portion of the
union's claim be separately classified so as to enable it to constitute a
consenting class?" 5
Postpetition Creditor Is Not
Entitled to Vote
Section 1126 of the Code, which
governs the acceptance of plans of

2
See, e.g., In re Bryson Properties,
XVIII, 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1992); In re
Greystone ill Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134
(5th Cir. 1991); In re Cantonwood Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership, 138 Bankr. 648 (D. Mass.
1992).
3
149 Bankr. 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1992).

4

5
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reorganization, provides that ''[t]he
holder of a claim or interest allowed
under section 502 of this title may
accept or reject a plan. " 6 The court
properly held that only prepetition
claims are allowed under Section
502. ''Since nowhere under section
502 is a post-petition secured lender
mentioned or implied, the class containing this lender as its sole member is not as a matter oflaw entitled
to vote on the plan. " 7 Although the
bankruptcy court cited several decisions holding that the concept of
impairment under Section 1124 applies only to prepetition claims, 8 it
nonetheless stated that it did not
have to reach the question of wheth~
er the class consisting of the postpetition lender was an impaired class.
Whether or not impaired, the postpetition lender class was not eligible
to vote and could not be the one
accepting class needed for confirmation under Section 1129(a)(10).

[VOL. 26 : 78 1993]

(b) A plan may designate a separate
class of claims consisting only of
every unsecured claim that is less
than or reduced to an amount that
the court approves as reasonable and
necessary for administrative convenience.

It is important to point out that,
although this section requires that
all claims in a particular class must
be substantially similar, it does not
say that all similar claims must be
in the same class. The bankruptcy
court in Kliegl Bros. mentions the
''split of opinion as to whether similar claims simply may be classified
together or whether they must be so
classified.' ' 9
The view that all similar claims
must be classified together was articulated by the court in In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc. : 10
Although section 1122(a) deals with
the placing of dissimilar claims in the
same class, it by necessary implication deals with the placing of similar
claims in the different classes. There
is no authority for classifying similar
claims differently other than section
1122(b) just discussed ... Classification cannot be used to divide like
claims into multiple classes in order
to create a consenting class so as to
permit confirmation." 11

Placing the Union's Unsecured
Claim in a Separate Class
Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, a plan may place
a claim or an interest in a particular
class only if such claim or interest
is substantially similar to the other
claims or interests of such class.

The court in Kliegl Bros. noted,
however, that there is disagreement
on the application of the view expressed in Mastercraft. Many of the

6

11 U.S.C. § 1126(a).
149 Bankr. at 307.
8
The c6urt cited In re Tavern Motor Inn,
Inc., 56 BR449, 452 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985);
In re Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, 31 BR 878, 881 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.
1983).
7

9

149 Bankr. at 307-308.
32 Bankr. 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983).
11
/d. at 108.
10
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cases following the Mastercraft approach do so only in the limited
circumstance where it is patently
obvious that the debtor's sole motivation for creating more than one
class of nonpriority unsecured
claims is to create one impaired
noninsider class that accepts the
plan, thus satisfying the requirements of Section 1129(a)(l0). 12
Several courts, including the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
In re Greystone III Joint Venture! 3
have expressed the clear warning
that the division of similar claims
into separate classes for the sole
purpose of gerrymandering will not
be tolerated.
In contrast to those decisions
holding that the separation of similar claims into different classes is
prohibited only if the primary purpose is to create an accepting class
of impaired claims, the bankruptcy
court in In re S & W Enterprises 14
has adopted the broader rule that
all general unsecured cbiims must
be in the same class unless they
are separable under Section 1122(b)
as small claims lumped together
for administrative convenience.
The judge in the Kliegl Bros. case
commented that the position announced in S & W Enterprises "is
clearly the exception, because it
completely abandons any necessity of
fmding an intent to create a con-

senting class before collapsing multiple classes. " 15
A More Flexible Approach to
Classification
A more flexible view on the separation of similar claims into different classes was expressed by the
bankruptcy court in In re AG Consultants Grain Division, Inc. 16
"In essence, [AG Consultants] holds
that it its appropriate to classify unsecured creditors separately if the differences in classification are in the
best interest of the creditors, foster
reorganization efforts, do not violate
the absolute priority rule, and do not
needlessly increase the number of
classes .... Thus, if it is reasonable
to classify like claims separately, it
may be done. 17

In Kliegl Bros., the court was
persuaded that the flexible approach
employed in AG Consultants was
the better one, "as long as the result
is not inherently unfair.'' 18 By adding that the result of separating similar claims into different classes must
not be inherently unfair, the court
in Kliegl Bros. treated the classification issue as one that is closely
linked to the requirement found in
Section 1129(b)(l), that is, that the
plan does not unfairly discriminate
against any nonaccepting impaired
class.
ts 149 Bankr. at 308.

12

16

149 Bankr. at 308.
13
948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991). See
supra note 2.
14
37Bankr. 153 (Bankr. N.D. Dl. 1984).

77 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1987).
17
149Bankr. at308.
18 !d.
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The charge of unfair discrimination
often arises with respect to the formation of classes of unsecured creditors
in order tq achieve a cram-down ...
In this context, the unfairness frequently alleged is that of placing like
claims in different classes where one
class is treated better than another. 19
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discrimination was not unfair.
Applying the four-part test, the
court found that a reasonable basis
existed for the difference in treatment in view of the union's insistence on at least a 75 percent recovery and a "suggestion" 21 that the
ffiEW might strike if paid less than
80 percent of its claims.

The court in Kliegl Bros. then set
forth a four-part test that has been
adopted by several courts for the
purpose of determining whether
there is unfair discrimination in the
formation of the classes in the plan:

We believe that such reasonable basis
exists because the debtor's ability to
continue to operate a union shop is
absolutely critical to its ability to
function successfully in its industry.
Within the Metropolitan New York
Area and most other major markets,
virtually all on-site electrical work,
including the installation of Kliegl
products, is performed by the mEW.
The mEW will not install or service
non-union manufactured products.
Consequently, were it not a union
shop, Kliegl would be disqualified
from bidding on, much less fulfilling,
many of the contracts upon which its
business depends. Maintaining the
debtor's union shop, and thereby insuring its continued ability to compete for and get access to work in its
industry, is clearly a reasonable basis
for creating a separate class for the
mEW . . . Since the debtor could
not survive without the mEW, the
discrimination between the classes of
unsecured creditors appears reasonably proportional to the consequences of failing to receive mEW
support. 22

1. Whether there is a reasonable
basis for the difference in
treatment which would preclude a finding of an unfair
discrimination,
2. Whether the debtor can consummate the plan without the
challenged discrimination,
3. Whether the discrimination is
proposed in good faith, and
4. The nature of the treatment of
the 'discriminated' class, or
as sometimes stated, whether
the degree of discrimination
is in direct proportion to its
rationale. 20
Although providing for a 75 percent recovery on unsecured claims
of the union, while offering general
unsecured creditors only a 15 percent recovery, is discriminatory,
the court concluded after a careful
examination of the facts that such

Also significant was the fact that
the debtor did' not have sufficient

19[d.
21
The court acknowledged, however,
that there was no testimony to support such
a suggestion.
22
149 Bankr. at 309.

20

ld. The court cited In re 11,111 Inc.,
117 Bankr. 471 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In
re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 Bankr. 840
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
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funds to pay all unsecured creditors
75 percent of their claims.

beyond gerrymandering to satisfy
Section 1129(a)(10), coupled with a
disparity in treatment that is necessary under the circumstances, discriminatory treatment is permissible. This approach is easily
forgotten as one reads those recent
decisions in single-asset real estate
cases holding that all unsecured
claims, including mortgage deficiency claims, must be lumped together in the same class.

Conclusion
The decision in Kliegl Bros. is an
important reminder that reorganization plans may, under certain circumstances, classify nonpriority
unsecured claims of equal rank in
different classes. If there is a need
for separate classification that goes
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